Energy & Critical Infrastructure

We use offensive AI agents to find
the way into your systems —
before someone else does.

Attackers don’t probe your utility once a year. They work continuously, across your entire internet-facing footprint, looking for the one forgotten vendor portal or reused credential that gets them a foothold. We run the same play — at machine speed, under contract, with a report you can act on.

Agents do the breadth. A human does the breaking. Nothing autonomous ever touches a control network.

Book a Scoping Call How It Works

24/7 Continuous attack surface testing, not an annual snapshot

IT/OT Focused on the boundary where enterprise access reaches operations

0 Autonomous actions taken against live control systems

CIP Findings mapped to NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and TSA directives

The Approach

Machine breadth.
Human judgment.

A traditional pen test gives you two weeks of one person’s attention, once a year. Your attack surface changes weekly and your adversary never stops. AI agents close that gap — they cover ground no consultant can cover by hand, and they do it again next week.

What the agents do

Breadth, repetition, and correlation at a scale a person can’t match

Continuously enumerate your internet-facing footprint — substations with forgotten remote access, vendor portals, VPN appliances, legacy HMIs someone exposed years ago
Correlate breach dumps and credential leaks against your domains, contractors, and third-party operators
Map attack paths across identity and Active Directory to find which ordinary account chains into operational access
Generate and test targeted phishing pretexts built from your real org structure and vendor relationships
Re-run all of it on a schedule, so the picture reflects your estate this month, not last February

What a human does

Every decision that carries consequence

Decides what gets touched, what gets confirmed in a lab, and what stays hands-off
Chains the findings into an actual attack path and proves the ones that matter
Separates the noise from the two findings that would genuinely put you on the news
Writes the report — what an attacker would do, in what order, and what to fix first
Sits with your engineers afterward and works through the remediation with them

Why this matters for a utility specifically. Almost no serious incident in this sector starts in the control network. It starts with a phished engineer, an exposed remote access appliance, a vendor with standing credentials, or a flat network where the business side can reach the process side. Those are enterprise problems that end in operational consequences — and they’re exactly what continuous, automated testing is good at finding.

Engagements

Scoped to the ways
operators actually get breached.

Each engagement can be run once, quarterly, or continuously. All of them produce findings mapped to the standards your auditor and your board already recognize.

Continuous External
Attack Surface Testing

Agent-driven discovery and validation of everything of yours that faces the internet — including the assets nobody on your team remembers standing up. Re-run on a schedule, with alerts when something new and reachable appears. This is where most footholds come from.

Asset discovery Exposed remote access Credential leak correlation Vendor portals Change alerting

IT/OT Boundary
Assessment

The question every operator should be able to answer: if an attacker owns a laptop in the business network, how far can they get toward the process network, and what stops them? We test the segmentation, the jump hosts, the remote access paths, and the identity chains that cross the boundary.

Segmentation validation Jump host review Identity path mapping Remote access controls Purdue model alignment

Adversary Emulation
& Red Team

A full-scope engagement that starts from the outside and works toward a defined objective, using the tradecraft groups targeting this sector actually use. Run purple-team style if you want your defenders learning in real time, or blind if you want to test detection honestly.

Objective-based scoping Phishing & social engineering Detection & response testing Purple team option MITRE ATT&CK for ICS mapping

Operational Applications
& APIs

Outage maps, customer portals, AMI and metering platforms, DER and inverter management, contractor scheduling systems — the growing layer of web applications that touch operational data and, increasingly, operational control. This is the core of our application security practice, applied to your stack.

Web & API penetration testing Secure code review Authentication & authorization DER / AMI platforms Customer-facing portals

Vendor & Supply
Chain Access Review

Integrators, OEMs, and maintenance contractors often hold standing remote access to your most sensitive systems, governed by a contract nobody has revisited. We inventory who can reach what, test whether those paths are actually constrained, and give you the evidence to renegotiate.

Third-party access inventory Standing credential review OEM remote support paths CIP-013 supply chain

NERC CIP & IEC 62443
Readiness

Gap assessment and evidence preparation against the standard that applies to you. Testing results are written to serve double duty — a technical roadmap for your engineers and audit evidence for your compliance team, without reformatting.

NERC CIP-005 / 007 / 010 / 013 IEC 62443 zones & conduits TSA Security Directives Evidence packaging

Testing Safely

Autonomous tooling has no business
in a live control network.

Plenty of vendors will sell you an AI that scans everything. In this sector that is how you trip a relay, brick a legacy PLC, or knock out a historian in the middle of a peak load day. Here are the rules the engagement runs under, in writing, before anyone touches anything.

Agents run against enterprise and internet-facing scope only Automated tooling is bounded to corporate IT, cloud, and the public attack surface. It does not reach into process networks, and the scope boundary is defined in the rules of engagement before the first packet.

Anything touching OT is human-led, read-only, and supervised No writes, no configuration changes, no protocol fuzzing against live devices. Passive observation and configuration review, with one of your operators in the room and the authority to stop.

Exploitation gets proven in a lab, not in production Where a finding needs to be demonstrated on operational equipment, it happens against a lab replica, a spare unit, or during a scheduled maintenance window — your call which.

Defined abort conditions and a named phone number You get a direct line, not a ticket queue. Agreed conditions halt the engagement automatically, and any one of your people can call it off mid-test without explaining themselves.

Every action is logged and reconstructable Full timestamped record of what was run, when, and against what — so if something breaks during the window, you can tell in minutes whether it was us. Usually it wasn’t, and being able to prove that quickly is worth the logging on its own.

Standards & Compliance

Findings written to satisfy
the regulator, not just the engineer.

Reports are structured so the same document works as a technical remediation plan and as audit evidence. If your obligation isn’t listed, engagements can usually be scoped against it directly.

NERC CIP

The controlling standard for bulk electric system operators. Testing maps to CIP-005 electronic security perimeters, CIP-007 system security management, CIP-010 configuration change monitoring, and CIP-013 supply chain risk.

IEC 62443 / ISA-99

The international reference for industrial automation security. Used to frame zone and conduit analysis, segmentation findings, and security level targets for asset owners and integrators alike.

TSA Security Directives

Applies to pipeline and rail operators. Relevant for segmentation validation, access control, continuous monitoring, and the annual assessment requirements those directives carry.

NIST SP 800-82

The federal guide to operational technology security. Used as the control reference for OT architecture review and for organizations without a sector-specific mandate.

CISA Performance Goals

The cross-sector baseline. A practical starting point for water systems, co-ops, and smaller operators who fall outside NERC CIP but still need a defensible standard to measure against.

MITRE ATT&CK for ICS

Adversary emulation is scoped and reported against ATT&CK for ICS techniques, so your detection team can map coverage gaps directly to the behaviors we exercised.

Who We Work With

Operators who can’t treat
an outage as an inconvenience.

Sized for organizations that carry real operational risk without carrying a twenty-person security team.

Electric Utilities & Co-ops Generation, transmission, and distribution operators under NERC CIP, including municipal utilities and rural cooperatives

Water & Wastewater Systems with real consequence and, typically, a fraction of the security budget the obligation deserves

Pipeline & Midstream Operators under TSA security directives needing assessment work that satisfies the requirement and finds real problems

Renewables & DER Solar, wind, and storage operators running fleets of internet-connected inverters and controllers across distributed sites

Grid-Adjacent Software Vendors selling into utilities — DERMS, AMI, outage management, VPP platforms — who need to pass their customers’ security reviews

Industrial & Manufacturing Plants where a compromised process network means lost production, damaged equipment, or a safety event

Not sure this applies to you? If your organization has a business network and a process network, and someone can get from one to the other, it applies to you. The scoping call is free and you’ll get a straight answer about whether testing is the right next step or whether you have architecture work to do first.

We use offensive AI agents to findthe way into your systems —before someone else does.

Machine breadth.Human judgment.

Scoped to the waysoperators actually get breached.

Autonomous tooling has no businessin a live control network.

Findings written to satisfythe regulator, not just the engineer.